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EFFECTS OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE PARTIES ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS CONTRACTS
Louis C. James*
I. REASON AND P~rNCIPLE
T HE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE is that the law expressly stipulated
by the parties should, on reason and principle, with one
exception1 govern the validity of the contract in conflict of laws.
This thesis does not relate to the incorporation of a foreign law
as part of the terms of a contract, for if that is the desire of the
parties they may adopt any law in the world.' The concern here
is only with that which has been called a reference of the contract
to a foreign law for its governance.3 Nevertheless, in a considera-
tion of the several problems and solutions relating to the central
core of this discussion, it is necessary to talk about more than
just the central thesis.
A. THEORIES ON CONFLICTS CONTRACT GOVERNANCE
There have been several methods used in the past to arrive
at the law which is to govern the contract. Among them may be
listed such things as (1) the place of making; (2) the place of
performance; (3) the principle of validating the contract if
possible; (4) the intention of the parties; and (5) the most vital
and substantial contact theory. This article, it is believed, will
* B.S., LL.B., University of Virginia, M.A., LL.M., Columbia University. Associate
Professor, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, D. C.
1 The one exception is that designated as public policy. Nussbaum, "Conflict
Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement," 51 Yale L. J. 893 (1942),
brings out this exception in a very informative manner.
2 Cheshire, International Contracts (Jackson Son & Co., Glasgow, 1948), at pp.
334, states: "In other words, the choice of foreign law may take two forms. The
parties may subject the contract as a whole to a foreign law, or they may merely
select certain provisions of a foreign law to regulate their rights and obligations.
The first is in the true sense the choice of a proper law. It has been described as
a 'reference to a foreign law.' The second is not the choice of a proper law, but
merely the incorporation in the contract of certain parts of a foreign law."
3 Cheshire, op. cit., p. 33.
4 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (Callaghan & Co., Chicago.
1947), Vol. 2, pp. 357, 393, and 402-8, lists these several theories in some detail.
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indicate that the intention of the parties has often been referred
to by the courts as of significant effect in choosing the law to
govern the contract. Of course, the intention-of-the-parties
theory5 may, in turn, be subdivided into a theory based on the
presumed intent of the parties and another resting on an expressly
stipulated intent.'
Before proceeding, it could be observed that while there are
three classes of intent, only two of them will be considered signifi-
cant here. First, there is the presumed intent of the parties
which is literally "presumed," or more nearly "assumed," by a
court in order to arrive at a decision which is proper in the eyes
of the court but where the parties, from anything they have said
or done, may not have had any intent at all. In many cases of
this character, the court "manufactures" or "makes" an intent
for the parties in order to arrive at what the court thinks is
5 It appears that some vestiges of the intent theory may be found as early as the
medieval "Statutists." In its application to contracts, it seems that it was first
elaborated by the French jurist Molinaeus (1500-66), while Lord Mansfield intro-
duced it Into the common law. At an early date in American history it was
recognized by Story and Chancellor Kent; it became familiar to American high
courts through Chief Justice Marshall. Professor Nussbaum, in 51 Yale L. $. 893
(1942), notes 12-21, lists several authorities, including Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr,
1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760), Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns, 146 (N. Y., 1811),
and Wayman v. Southard, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). See also Boseman v.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U. S. 196, 57 S. Ct. 686, 81 L. Ed. 1036 (1937).
Decisions of the state courts are listed in Beale, Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis
& Co., New York, 1935), Vol. 2, pp. 1118-74. Among the American cases which
illustrate the use of a stipulation clause disclosing the intent of the parties as to
the governing law are the holdings in The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102,
46 L. Ed. 190 (1901), in E. Gerlie & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F. (2d) 115 (1931),
and in Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F. (2d) 724 (1925). An annotation
in 112 A. L. R. 124 gives both the insurance case listings and the cases as to
money-lender contracts. In the cases of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S.
551, 24 S. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788 (1904), and of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen,
179 U. S. 262, 21 S. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181 (1900), the United States Supreme Court
recognized the presence of expressed stipulations but considered the same to be
ineffective because contra to the public policy of the forum. See also, Knott v.
Botany Mills. 179 U. S. 69, 21 S. Ct. 30, 45 L. Ed. 90 (1900), and New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 S. Ct. 962, 44 L. Ed. 1116 (1900). where the
clauses were ineffective because they would have made the contracts illegal under
the laws of the place of making. Consider also the holding in United Divers
Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co.. 289 F. 316 (1923).
6 It would appear that the limitations on the use of the intent theory, whether
that theory Is expressed in terms of presumed or expressed intent, are more or less
the same. Compare the English cases of Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping
Company, Ltd. F19391, A. C. 277. and Rex v. International Trustee for. etc.,
Bondholders A. G. r1937], A. 0. 500. 529. plus the American holding in William
Wbitman Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 125 F. Supp. 137 (1954). with the
holding,; In Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.. 274 U. S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626.
71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927). and in Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30.
150 N. W. 229 (1914), for verification of this point.
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reasonable. This paper expresses no interest in this type of
"presumed" intent, so when that expression is used herein it does
not embrace this "court-made" intent. Second, there is the normal
intent of the 'parties flowing from what the parties have done or
said, which indicates to any rational person what they actually
intended even though they did not by an expressed statement in
the contract indicate the law which they desired to govern their
agreement. Here, they had an intent; it is evidenced from what
they did and said; it is not a "court-made" intent, but a "party-
made" intent. And third, there is the expressed intent of the
parties to have a certain law of some reasonable place to govern
their contractual relations. It is only with the last two of these
three types of intent that interest is here expressed and it is
believed that what follows will indicate that the expressly stipu-
lated intent 7 of the parties is to be preferred to that of their
presumed intent," as well as to the other means enumerated above.
Of course, if the parties have not expressly stipulated the law to
govern their contract, then the courts of the forum must endeavor
to arrive at a choice of law by other means. The attention of this
article, therefore, will be focused upon the effects of the autonomy
theory9 on the validity ° of conflict-of-laws contracts.1
7 See Cook, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the Parties,"
32 Ill. L. Rev. 899 (1938), particularly p. 903, note 11, and the cases of Vita Food
Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. (1939], A. C. 277 at 289. and Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226 at 233, 11 S. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 at 500
(1891).
8 Cheshire, op. cit.. 7-90, not only discusses the several means adopted by courts
and writers in the determination of the choice of law to govern the contract but
also indicates many of the reasons why so many of these means are highly arti-
ficial and illogical. The late Professor Cook apparently demolished much of the
reasoning behind the "place of making" theory in his article entitled "'Contracts'
and the 'Conflict of Laws.'" 31 Ill. L. Rev. 143 (1936). Two years later, he
summed up by saying: "The conclusions reached were that the theory, as formu-
lated ... (1) cannot be derived from a logical application of its alleged 'territorial
basis' . . . (3) is not, if literally applied, in accord with the actual phenomena of
judicial decisions (the conduct of counsel and judges) ;. . . (5) does not offer as
great a degree of 'certainty' as at first sight may seem to be the case: and (6)
leads to artificial and arbitrary results which take insufficient account of the needs
of the community." He also found that the "presumed intention" theory seemed,
on the whole, to be a "somewhat cumbersome and misleading way of expressing a
rule that the 'law' to be applied is that of the state with which the transaction on
the whole has the most substantial or vital connection." Cook. " 'Contracts' and the
Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the Parties," 32 I1. T,. Rev. SP9 (19,8). at 899 and
920.
9There has been some interesting foreign writing on the "intent theory" in
general. See Batiffol. Les Conflits de Lois (41 Mati~,re de Contrats (1939) - Haudek.
Die Bedeuttnig des Parteiwillens in Int. Privatreeht (1931) : Caleb. Essai sitr le
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B. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
1. Incorporating Foreign, Laws Into the Contract
It is desirable to note, at the outset, that Judge Learned Hand
once observed that people cannot
by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may,
of course, incorporate any provisions they wish into their
agreements-a statute like anything else-and when they do,
courts Will try to make sense out of the whole, so far as they
can. But an agreement is not a contract, except as the law
says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull on one's
bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation, and the
parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no more than
whether their acts are torts or crimes.
12
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the right of incorporation
may be freely exercised by the parties to a contract.1 ',
No one would doubt that the parties to an English con-
tract of sale, for instance, may adopt the provisions of the
German code dealing with the effects of such a contract, pro-
vided these provisions are not contrary to some compulsory
rule of the English law. The parties may do so either by a
verbatim transcription of the pertinent provisions, or by a
general statement that their rights and duties in this matter
Principe de L'Autonontie de la Volonte en Droit Int. Priv (1927) ; Niboyet, "La
Theorie de L'autonomie de la Volontc," 16 Recueil des Cours 5 (1927) ; Wolff, "The
Choice of Law by the Parties in International Contracts," (1937), Judicial Review
110: Schnitzer, "Partei-antonomic," 35 Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 305, 323
(1939).
10 It is believed that there is more difficulty experienced in this area of the
several elements of a contract than in any of the others. See Goodrich, Handbook
of the Conflict of Laws (West Publishing Co.. St. Paul, 1949), 3d Ed., 312-34, as
well as the numerous other authorities cited by him in the several notes thereto.
11 Only the so-called commercial contracts are considered herein. Rabel, op. cit.,
Vol. 2, 357, provides a breakdown of the several types of conflict-of-laws contracts.
12 See the opinion in the case of E. Gerlie & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 48 F. (2d)
115 (1931), at p. 117. Professor Nussbaum regarded the statement of Judge Hand
to the effect that people cannot "by agreement substitute the law of another place"
to be an "isolated" one: Nussbaum. "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus
Restatement," 51 Yale L. J. 893 (1942), at p. 897, note 2.
13 Cheshire, op. cit., p. 34. Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 376-84, cites many instances.
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shall be subject to German law. In the latter event, the per-
tinent provisions of the German code are deemed as written
out at length in the agreement. In either case, the foreign
provisions become English terms, and will be considered as
such. Also, they remain constant in the sense that these pro-
visions are unaffected by a change in German law occurring
after the date of the contract. This is not true when the for-
eign law is chosen as a whole to govern a contract; and in
such an event, the reference is to a living and constantly
evolving body of law.14  In this event, it is said that there is
no factual connection of the contract at all with the foreign
law and, therefore, the referral is logically inappropriate. 15
a. Imperative Rules
The aforementioned statement by Judge Hand leads into
another problem. Many scholars believe that a contract is
born into a certain law, the imperative rules of which it finds
itself incapable of escaping.16  This is to say that any rule
of law which the parties to a contract cannot modify in its
purely local setting, they cannot avoid by an expressed stipu-
lation that another law shall govern it.
17
It may be admitted that if both parties are domiciled in
State X and they evade the usury laws of that state by mak-
14 Cheshire, op. cit., p. 34. But see Morris. "The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solu-
tionis---A Fallacy Exploded," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 505 (1953), at p. 507.
15 Cheshire, op. cit., pp. 34-44. The indication that contracts must have a con-
nection with a foreign law for that law to govern a contract seems somewhat
illogical. It is as illogical to say this as to say that if two men from "outer space,"
who had made a contract in "outer space," came to the Earth and became natural-
ized citizens of the United States that because their contract had no contacts or
connections (or any of the other means now used by the courts, such as the place
of making theory) with the Earth, they would be unable to find any court on the
Earth to adjudge their legal relations evolving from their contract. To assume
this is to assume the irrational in law.
16 Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 394, states: "... in the majority opinion of the
scholars, every contract is born into a certain law, the 'imperative rules' of which
it cannot escape. That is, any rules of this law which parties cannot modify by
contracting in a purely domestic sphere they do not avoid by an agreement that
another law should govern."
17 Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 4, note 20. But see Nussbaum, "The 'Separability
Doctrine' in American and Foreign Arbitration," 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. 609 (1940);
Cook, "'Contracts' and the 'Conflict of Laws'," 31 Ill. L. Rev. 143 (1936), at p.
161; Nussbaum, Deutsches Int. Privatrecht (1932), p. 237; and Batiffol, Les Con-
flits de Lois Matire de Contrats (1938), p. 340.
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ing a contract to be governed by the law of another state,
which will permit their proposed higher rate of interest on a
loan, that possibly the public policy considerations of State X
would be sufficient ground to deny them this foreign-law re-
ferral.18 Even here, it would seem that in order to deny them
the use of a foreign law, that law must be shown to be against
the public policy of the law of a place having the most natural
or vital connection with some essential element of the trans-
action as viewed by the forum,"' or against a strong public
policy of the forum. However, in case of usury the policy
of the same state of both parties, and in which state the con-
tract is actually made and to be performed, could more easily
say that this is a local contract and one involving usury in
which the local law has a particular interest," than if it were
a conflict-of-laws contract involving, let us say, parties from
several states.2 The subject matter might be so obnoxious to
the laws of the state of domicil, which is also the state of
making and performance, that to permit the contract to be
IS Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1951),
2d Ed., pp. 239-40, indicates that, in usury cases, the courts seem to lean toward
concessions that should be made in trade and commerce. He then asks, "If such
concessions are desirable here, why not in all cases?' He proceeds: "Then, too,
to quote again the words of the Iowa court" [in Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194
(1897)], "men are not presumed by the law to act in folly or in dishonesty, but
rather that they intended in good faith that their acts shall be valid and what
they purport to be." He further states: "To apply the law which will uphold
the contract, if the contract has some bona fide substantial connection with the
place of that law, would, it is believed, in carrying out the purposes which the
parties had in view in their negotiations, better serve business convenience by
making their acts legally, that which they purport to be; i.e., an enforcible prom-
ise." At page 240, note 60, Stumberg cites several authorities. See also, Grotis,
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II, 11, 5(2) (1625) ; Cereti, Le Obbligazioni mel Diritto
Int. Privato 36 (1925); Story, Commentaries on Conflict of Laws (Bigelow ed.,
1883), § 261. Judicial comments may be found in Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196
U. S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 311, 49 L. Ed. 551 (1904) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v., Hill, 193
U. S. 551, 24 S. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788 (1904): Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v.
Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 11 S. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 (1891). But see Cook, "'Con.
tracts' and the 'Conflict of Laws,'" 31 Ill. L. Rev. 14'3 (1936), and note Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws (1934), § 333.
19 Morris, Dicey's Conflict of Laws (6th Ed., 1949), pp. 584-9; Nussbaum, Money
in the Law (Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1939), p. 245. See also the language of
Stone, J., in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403 at 408, 47 S.
Ct. 626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 at 1126-7 (1927).
20 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1942), pp. 4024, 423.
21 See Stumberg, "Conflict of Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases," 10
Tex. T. Rev. 163 (1932), at 171; Cheatham, "International Law Distinctions in
the Conflict of Laws." 21 Cornell L. Q. 570 (1936), at p. 583, and other authors
there cited in note 50.
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governed by any foreign law that would validate it would be
considered a coup de force 2 against the very framework of
the domiciliary state's social structure. :3
What, however, are these imperative rules which are ines-
capable ?24 When this question is asked the scholars differ in
the determination of what rules are imperative. Shall we re-
duce these so-called imperative rules to a limited number? For
instance, shall we reduce them to problems of public policy?
If we did, we would have such examples as wagering, usury,
smuggling and possibly social protection. The last mentioned
might, for instance, take into its scope all of the contracts
relating to life insurance or fire insurance.2" Certainly no
one would say that insurance does not fit into the concept of
social protection. If we were to enlarge the scope of impera-
tive rules where would we be able to stop? Can we say that
they should include the formation and validity of contracts,
the freedom to contract, the change of conditions (rebus sic
22 Literally, a blow of force. In essence, as used here, it means a heavy blow to
the very framework of society.
23 The right of self-protection or self-defense resides in all body-politic groups.
When the very life of a state is threatened, or its social structure undermined, the
state has a right to use those reasonable methods necessary to defend itself. But
the question always exists, are the forces applied against the state of sufficient
force to justify the state's counterforce? Note the public policy consideration in
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 11 S. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497
(1891), and the limitations on the forum's use of public policy limitations by con-
stitutional provisions in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 S. Ct. 338, 74
L. Ed. 926 (1930). See also Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe. 331
U. S. 586. 67 S. Gt. 1355. 91 L. Ed. 1687 (1947) * Pacific Empl. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Ace. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629. 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939): John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates. 299 U. S. 179. 57 S. Ct. 129. 81 L. Ed. 106 (1936)
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, -94 U. S. 532. 55 S. Ct. 518. 79
L. Ed. 1044 (1935) : Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dettor Pine Land Co.,
292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634. 7S L. Ed. 1178 (1934) : Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 288 U. S. 145. 52 S. Ct. 571. 76 L. Ed. 1026 (1932).
24 Rabel. op. cit., Vol. 2. pp. 394-5. states: "Although the numerous followers of
this doctrine are categoric in asserting that imperative rules are inescapable, they
strongly disagree in determining what rules are imnerative. The learned reporter
of the Institute of International Law. Baron Nolde. sternly warned against the
frequent tendency of the literature to reduce these norms to a small number of
secondary problems identical with what is properly ealled 'ordre pthlie.' These
concern such classic examples as wagering, usury, smuggling, or social protection.
Imperative rules, on the contrary, according to the reporter's energetic assertion,
cover a 'vast and normal domain.' including formation and validity of contracts,
the principle of freedom of contracting. .. ."
25 Life and fire insurance are only two of many examples that might be listed
under the category of social protection.
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stantibus),2" rescission on the ground of non-performance, the
effect of agreements on third persons, assignments, and other
legal consequences flowing from contractual relations ?27 If
we should enlarge the imperative norms to such proportions,
very little would be left for the principle of party autonomy.
It seems, then, in brief, that no one appears able to demark
the boundaries of the imperative norms.
b. Application of Imperative Norms
Conceding that certain imperative norms do exist, the ques-
tion is then one as to how these imperative norms are to be
applied to ascertain the validity of the contract. For this
purpose, it is necessary to discuss them in detail.
Capacity of the parties to a contract involves, first, the
problem of protecting contractual relations of parties of im-
mature thought.2" Infants, married women, insane persons and
the like must receive reasonable protection from some law in
order that their incapacity may not be imposed upon by those
of mature thought. It has been stated that the law govern-
ing the capacity of parties to a mercantile contract "is a mat-
ter of speculation so far as the English authorities are con-
cerned." 29  Perhaps few people would disagree with this state-
ment if it were also applied to the American scene. One English
26 For a discussion of the meaning of rebus sic stantibus, see Hill, "The Doctrine
of Rebus Sic Stantibus in international Law," 9 Univ. of Mo. Studies, No. 3
(1934); Williams, "Permanence of Treaties," 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 89 (1928);
Kaufman. Das Wesen. des Volkerrechts und die Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus
(1911); Fairman, "Implied Resolutive Conditions in Treaties," 29 Am. J. Int'l L.
219 (1935) ; Huang, Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law (1935) ;
Pouritch, De La Clause "Rebus Sic Stantibus" (1918). For cases and opinions
construing this doctrine, see: Op. of Acting Atty. Gen. Biddle with Respect to
International Load Line Convention, 4 Op. Att. Gen. U. S., 119 (1941) ; the Free
Zones of Savoy and Gex, P. C. I. J., ser. A/B, No. 46, 156-8 (1932).
27 Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 395.
28 Maine, Ancient Law (3d Am. ed. from 5th London ed., 1883), at p. 164, says:
"The child before years of discretion, the orphan under guardianship, the adjudged
lunatic, have all their capacities and incapacities regulated by the Law of Persons.
But why? The reason is differently expressed in the conventional language of
different systems, but in substance it is stated to the same effect by all. The great
majority of Jurists are constant to the principle that the classes of persons just
mentioned are subject to extrinsic control on the single ground that they do not
possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests: in other words,
that they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by Contract."
29 Cheshire, op. cit., p. 45.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
authority did indicate that the choice lies "between the lex domi-
cilii, the lex loci contractus and the proper law of the obliga-
tions."" The latter, in his opinion, is that law with which the
contract has the most vital and substantial contacts. The diffi-
culty here involves several factors. If we use the law of the
domicil, how far afield shall we extend the scope of the domi-
cil ?' If we choose the law of the place of making, is this
not .too rigid? Often parties make contracts while on a vaca-
tion or on a business trip. Is "law by chance" 2 to govern their
capacity? It might be equally as difficult to arrive at the most
vital and substantial contact of the contract. How are we to evalu-
ate the most vital and substantial contact? Also, can we say that
any one state3 3 is the sole depositary of just laws 4 which regulate
conflict-of-laws contracting? By what means do we ascertain what
is just? 35  Once we stipulate that it is extremely difficult to as-
30 Ibid.
31 Cheshire, op. cit., at p. 46, states: "... it is no doubt true that a person who
is subject to a disability by his lex domiciliii cannot in general confer capacity upon
himself by choosing a more favorable law. Yet it is neither heretical nor incon-
sistent to say that the disability may be disregarded if he makes a contract that
has no factual connection with the country of his domicil. This disregard is not
necessarily an evasion of the lex domicilif, since it does not follow that an in-
capacity imposed by that law is intended to affect transactions of a substantially
foreign character."
32 I have used the expression "law by chance" to indicate the application of
some foreign law to contract governance by virtue of a contract being made by
two groups of parties who by chance meet in a foreign land, on possibly a vaca-
tion or a business trip, and there make a contract. Should this chance meeting
allow the law of that place to govern the contract when the contract has no rela-
tion to the place other than that it was made there?
33 For ready reference to the state, see Dunning, A History of Political Theories,
Ancient and Mediaeval (Macmillan & Co., London, 1927), particularly pp. vii-xxv,
43, 46. 55-98, 99-129, 131-254. 280-325; Dunning, A History of Political Theories
from Luther to Montesqui (Macmillan & Co., London, 1927), pp. 81-124, 263-305,
335-390; Dunning, A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer
(Macmillan Co., New York, 1926), pp. 248-408; Willoughby, The Fundamental
Concepts of Public Law (Macmillan Co., New York, 1924), pp. 72-100, 144-6, 140-58,
430-42; Merriam, A History of American Political Theories (Macmillan Co., New
York, 1920), pp. 143-73, 252-302; Maxey, Political Philosophers (Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1948), Rev. Ed., pp. 1-26, 162-84, 199-211. See also Sabine, A History
of Political Theory (H. Holt & Co., New York, 1937), and Bowle, Western Political
Thought (Oxford University Press, New York, 1948).
.34 For information on any state being the sole depositary of just laws. see some
interesting comments on law making and law adjudging In Wilson. The State
(D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1889). § 49. 69, 77-8, 85, 90-1, 101, 104, 106, 275, 296,
302, 353-7, 410, 436, 449, 494-503, 538, 543, 559-66.
S35 Professor Patterson finds that justice and social welfare are at best vague
terms about which judges will differ, as will other men: Patterson, Jurisprudence:
Ien and Ideas of the Law (Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1953), 1st printed ed.,
p. 53.
AUTONOMY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS CONTRACTS
certain the law to govern capacity of the parties by the methods
used,"0 would it not be more acceptable to permit the parties to
choose their own law to govern their contract7 In the mid-
twentieth century is not one state as much interested as an-
other in protecting parties of immature minds from being im-
posed upon, or, for that matter, in shielding parties of unequal
economic status from being imposed upon? 37  "Fair play" or
"rough play" in the application of legal concepts is not con-
fined to any one nation, as history so well illustrates.38
Formal validity" involves the following problems: first, are
the formal requirements of the place of making sufficient else-
where; second, are the formal requirements of the place of mak-
ing compulsory ;40 and, third, may the parties be permitted ex-
pressly to stipulate the law to govern the formal validity of
their contract? On reason and principle, the local law where a
contract is made should be sufficient to meet the formal require-
ments of a contract. If the contract meets the formal require-
ments at the place of making, its formalities should be sufficient
at any other place. But should the local law requirements where
the parties may be merely by chance, as on a trip during a va-
cation for instance, be compulsory for the formal validity of the
contract? The answer seems to be no."'
36 These methods include the place of making, the place of performance, the
validating of the contract if at all possible, the presumed intent of the parties,
and the most vital and substantial contact.
37 Would any one deny that we are in the midst of a world movement toward
parental government? It is not the question whether this revolution in our world
social structure is good or bad; it is a fact that most nations of the world today
seem to believe that the individual lives the "good life" better under the ever-
supervising wing of state paternalism than by any other means. Therefore, the
individual's interests seem as safe in one state as in another. The movement
toward world socialism is a fact that few dispute.
38 See materials cited in note 34, ante.
89 See Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), § 334, for the inflexible rule there
expounded. This rule is not in accord with the authorities for, as viewed by them,
the rule seems to lie only with the convenience of the parties: Von Bar, Theory
and Practice of Private International Law (Gillespie's trans., 1892), § 123; Batiffol,
op. cit., 364: Cheshire, op. cit., 243; Introductory Law to the German Civil Code,
Art. 11(1) (1). See also Ross v. Ross, 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307 (1894); Hall v.
Cordell. 142 U. S. 116, 12 S. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 (1891) ; Morson v. Second Nat.
Bank, 306 Mass. 588. 29 N. E. (2d) 19 (1940); Harwood v. Security Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 263 Mass. 341, 161 N. E. 589 (1928) ; D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly
Cheese Co., 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372 (1914) ; the cases set forth in Goodrich,
op. cit., pp. 272-3, note .58: and the note in 54 Harv. L. Rev. 331.
40 Cheshire, op. cit., pp. 60-3.
41 Ibid., p. 60.
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An example will illustrate this point. Two parties on a
train which is traveling from Paris to Istanbul get together and
arrange a contract while the train is passing through Vienna.
Should the mere fact that they are passing through Vienna at
the time they complete the contract require them to govern
the formal requirements of their contract by Austrian law? If
Austrian law is to govern here and Austrian law merely requires
that a revenue stamp be affixed to the contract to make it for-
mally valid, then this contract without the stamp would be for-
mally invalid. But what reasonable man would maintain such a
principle to be rational?
Suppose the parties in the above example were Englishmen.
What would be improper in their using English formal require-
ments to validate the contract? They would be familiar, most
likely, with their home law. If they were permitted to stipulate
expressly their choice of law to govern the formal validity of
their contract, it would save them much uncertainty as well as
the inconvenience of obtaining Austrian legal advice.
It is maintained by some writers that essential validity must
be governed by a law arrived at by other means than by the ex-
pressed stipulations of the parties.42 Professor Goodrich, how-
ever, once used two noteworthy illustrations in order to pose
a vital question. He wrote:
A New York man may mail a forgotten letter of acceptance
at a mail box at his New Jersey golf club, and all the pre-
liminary transactions and the thing stipulated for may be
centered in New York. Two Chicago businessmen on a train
from Chicago to New York may effect several agreements
on their journey, one in each of the states through which the
train passes. Not one of these agreements may concern
42 See Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract?" 23 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1909-10), at pp. 79, 194 and 260; Lorenzen, "Validity and Effects of Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws," 30 Yale L. J. 565 (1921), at 655, and in 31 Yale L. J. 53
(1921) ; Beale, op. cit., Vol. 2, §§ 311.1-375.2 and 1173; Goodrich, op. cit., p. 326;
Cheshire, op. cit., pp. 18-44. Other authors might be cited but it is thought that
this list is sufficient. Those interested in a further listing of persons opposed to
the autonomy theory are referred to the various notes of the authors cited herein
at the sections and pages noted.
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things in Indiana, Ohio, or Pennsylvania in any way. Why,
then, it is asked, should the respective laws of these states
govern the transactions?
43
Using the examples given, we might well ask why impera-
tive norms in conflict-of-laws contracts should be applied when
the application thereof benefits no one44 and, actually, such norms
could operate to restrict the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties4l or at least serve to promote uncertainty and unpredicta-
bility ?46 Even if it is admitted that every contract must be born
into some law,47 the questions remain-what law?
Where, for example, were the contracts born" in the illus-
trations quoted above? When parties, by mere chance, com-
plete a contract in some place where they do not know the legal
effects of their acts, is birth in contract law to be governed by
43 Goodrich, op. cit., p. 323.
4- Predictability of law, certainty in law, and uniformity in law will, of course,
benefit international and interstate contract transactions. It is contended that
these may be attained by the use of the autonomy theory; that the present means
in use lead to uncertainty, unpredictability and non-uniformity in legal norms. No
one, not even the states of the parties, will be benefited by the stagnation of inter-
national contractual transactions or the impeding of them by the present methods
in use.
45 The "actual" reasonable expectations of the immediate parties to the contract
can be more adequately fulfilled if the parties themselves, who know what they
want from their contract, are permitted to choose the law that will give them
what they want.
46 In addition to the points made in notes 44 and 45, ante, it could be suggested
that "law by chance" does not seem promotive of the interests of any one. See
also note 32, ante.
47 Note 16, ante. Professor Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases
Versus Restatement," 51 Yale L. J. 893 (1942), at pp. 908-9, says: "As regards
intrinsic validity, the law of the place of contracting has the power to destroy the
contract (or a stipulation thereof), by making it illegal. There is some truth in
the centuries-old doctrine that parties contracting in a given territory must not
disobey its prohibitions set up by the law of that territory. Invalidity attached
there to contracts violative of local prohibitions should ordinarily, at least, be
recognized by foreign courts just as legal effects of torts originating in the ler
delicti communi are so recognized. Though not a pre-existing obligation imposed
on courts, it is well-qettled law and the writer believes. sound policy for the locl
courts ordinarily to hold a contract invalid where it is invalidated because illegal
by the lex loci contracti.q. To this extent no objection is raised against the plnce-
of-contracting rule, barring, of course, the 'mailbox' theory of the Restatement
... While invalidity under the lex loci. csntractns means ordinarily invalidity every-
where, a corresponding rule does not follow in the case of validity."
48 Taking a rather absurd case to explain the rather absurd theories now in use.
suppose two people placed their signatures to an agreement when the sent on the
train they were using was exactly over the center of the line dividing two states.
Whicb system of state law would govern the contract if the "place of making"
theory was utilized?
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
chance ? Is mathematical rigidity to be permitted to supplant
the highly necessary flexibility of law"0 to meet the demands of
the parties and of society of which they are a part? What
"crime" would be committed if the parties were permitted to
eliminate this chaos by expressly stipulating the law to govern
their contract? Why not, then, let the contract be born in the
law of the place expressly stipulated by the parties?
If it be assumed that the parties to the contract are legis-
lating"' when they expressly stipulate a foreign law to govern
their contract, for whom are they legislating other than them-
selves? If they are legislating in this instance, are there not
other similar examples of such legislation ?52
Would the presumed intention of the parties, as previously
defined, prove a more feasible means in arriving at the choice
of law to govern contracts? Why may the parties be permitted
to accomplish by their acts and words what they cannot do di-
rectly by an expressed statement of intent as to the governing
49 See note 32, ante.
50 The late Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, in his treatise entitled The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Harvard University Press, 1949), at p.
432, stated: "What is needed is not a completely static system--even if such a
system were possible-but a set of guiding principles which make provision for
as much certainty as may reasonably be hoped for in a changing world, at the
same time providing for not only needed flexibility but also continuity of growth."
51 Cook, op. cit., p. 393, wrote: "... the first thing to be noted is that if the
parties 'legislate,' they do so only for themselves; they are seeking to determine
primarily what rights each shall have as against the other, and are not seeking
to 'make law' for other persons . . . To sustain the argument of Professors Loren-
zen. Beale, and Goodrich, it is therefore necessary to show that this kind of
'legislation'-if one calls it that-is never permitted under our legal system, for
if it is permitted in other fields it may well be that the same thing is true in the
field we are considering. It requires only slight observation to discover that the
assertion that such 'legislation' is not permitted is quite contrary to the facts:
many agreements which purport to do this are given effect, others are held in-
effective. No universal rule . . . can be formulated . . . This being so, this
question . . . must be answered by the court in each 'new' case that is presented
for adjudication before we can know whether or not the parties have been suc-
cessful in their attempt."
52 While Professor Cook, without making an exhaustive survey, found eleven
instances of party legislation, only two are here noted. He wrote, op. cit., pp. 393-4.
that he had observed that: "(1) In the case of an ordinary bailment, contract
provisions altering what would otherwise be the relative rights and duties of bailor
and bailee are, within certain limits, valid . . . (2) It is generally recognized that
even common carriers can by agreement with passengers alter what would other-
wise be their duties . . . These limitations must be 'just and reasonable' and in
most states may not, where the passenger pays his way, wholly exempt the carrier
from liability for negligence. For the purpose of the present discussion it is not
material how far limitations of this kind may go. What is of importance is that
the parties can to a greater or lesser degree alter what would otherwise be the
logal consequences of their transactions."
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law of their contract 53 Would the use of the theory of the place
of performance 4 help solve the problem of choice of law to govern
the contract? If the contract were one to be performed in sev-
eral states,55 what one state law would the forum choose as the
law to govern the contract? Seeing the impossibility of the situa-
tion, the forum might be forced to use its own law or be driven
back to find the place of contracting.
If we should use the most vital and substantial contact theory 56
in arriving at the law to govern the contract, what means can
be adopted to evaluate these contacts? Under this theory, it
may be possible for an arbitrary judge to adjudge some minor
connection of a contract with the judge's home state as being
the "most vital" one, for home law may be the "best" law to
some judges.5" If logic is used to arrive at the "most vital con-
tact," is it not possible to obtain different conclusions on the
same factual matter by choosing improper major or minor prem-
ises?"" Better still, is not the answer to the question to be found
in the answer to the query as to whether or not the life of the
law is to be found in logic or in experience ?59
53 Ibid., at pp. 414-8; Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 326-7.
54 Is not the place of performance, as well as the place of making, a spatial
contact of the contract?
55 Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 324-5.
50 Cheshire, op. cit., pp. 45-90; Garveson, "The Proper Law of Commercial Con-
tracts as Developed in the English Legal System." in Lectures on the Conflict of
Laws and International Contracts (1951), pp. 1-33. It would seem that Professor
Cheshire, by attempting to avoid the autonomy theory, has let himself in for some
criticism over his methods for the localization of any given contract. To him,
localization means that the parties "declare that they regard the relationship
which they create by their agreement as situate in" some specified country. Pro-
fessor Martin Wolff, writing under the title of "Problems of Public and Private
International Law," in the Grotius Society Transactions for 1949, Vol. 35, at pp.
143-4, doubts whether this formula is helpful. He says it represents "a retro-
gressive step from Westlake back to Savigny. According to Savigny it was the
seat of the legal relationship that had to be found. He chose a geographical image.
Westlake's admirable instinct caused him to say that we ought to find the legal
system with which the given relationship has the most real connection, and not
this, that or the other country. True. most legal systems are in force within a
certain country, and the localization of a contract in such country means in most
cases the subjection of the contract to the legal system which is in force there.
But not always. That is manifest in the case of a change of sovereignties as a
consequence of cession of territory." Professor Wolff illustrates this point by
citing several examples of cases in which a change in sovereignty did come about
between the time of making and the final resolution of the contracts involved.
57 Grsveson, op. cit., at pp. 6-12.
58 Cook op. cit.. pp. 347-70.
.59 See the quotation from the works of the late Mr. Justice Riollnes in Patterson.
op. cit., p. 5.
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2. Testing For Legality
Passing to the next problem the question is one as to which
law should govern for the purpose of determining the legality of
the contract.60 Suppose a contract is illegal by the law of the
place of making, the law of the place of performance, or of the
law of the "most vital and substantial contacts," should the
parties be able by an expressed stipulation to choose the law of
the contract in order to make it legal? Dicey has indicated that
a contract unlawful by the law of the place of making is in-
valid elsewhere. 1 Possibly, the origin of this rule is based
upon strong moral connotation; possibly, it is assumed that no
civilized nation would enforce an illegal contact because it would
be immoral.2 Several questions may evolve from this intricate
web. For example: what nations are civilized ;63 how does one
arrive at standards of civilization; are all legal contracts based
upon moral concepts ;64 how does one separate morals from law
60 In general, see Stumberg, op. cit., pp. 266-70, and Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 304-8.
Wolff, op. cit., pp. 145-9, provides an able discussion of the case of Vita Food Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Company, Ltd., [1939] A. C. 277, and particularly with
respect to the ambiguous meanings of the words "bona fide" and "legal" as used
therein by Lord Wright. It could be said that all the interpretations of these two
concepts provided by Lord Wright are but guesses unless and umtil the same are
defined with some degree of adequacy. See further, note 47, ante, and the opinions
in Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 311, 49 L. Ed. 551 (1904) ; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 24 S. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788 (1904) ; Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 11 S. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497 (1891).
61 Morris, Dicey's Conflict of Laws (6th Ed., 1949), pp. 604-16.
62 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 8, Ch. 4, § 1: Friedmann, Legal Theory (3d
Ed., 1953), pp. 77-81; Lorenzen, "Cause and Consideration in the Law of Con-
tracts," 28 Yale L. J. 621 (1919) ; Pound, "Liberty of Contract," 18 Yale L. J. 454
(1909) ; Cohen, "The Basis of Contract," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1933). Another
element, today, would enter into the reason why "legal" contracts should be en-
forced and "illegal" ones not enforced, namely, the preservation of the social order
through valid commercial transactions. But this same reason why contracts should
be enforced if legal may be supplemented by the equally necessary rule that undue
hindrances of contract relations may stifle commercial transactions the world
over. The smugness of local moral policies must not be permitted to interfere
with normal commercial transactions. We should be careful before we declare
a contract is illegal by any law; we must weigh all of the social values involved-
those of the individual, those of the states of the parties, and those of the world
order. See Kessler, "Contract as a Principle of Order," quoted in Kessler and
Sharp, Cases on Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1950). pp. iii-xvi; Llewellyn, "What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective." 40 Yale L. J. 704 (1931) ; Williston, "Free-
dom of Contract," 6 Cornell L. Q. 365 (1921).
63 It is as impossible to answer this question as it is to count the falling autumnal
leaves. Any answer would depend on the standard of measurement. Should it be
bathtubs, radios, cars. or what?
64 An agreement must have legal connotations to be a contract in the eyes of
the law: Pollock, The Principles of Contract (1876), cited in Cohen and Cohen,
Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York,
1951), pp. 1134.
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in the first instance; should one, for this purpose, rely upon
positivism?"
Other questions may arise at this point. Assuming it to be
possible to arrive at an accurate listing of the civilized nations,
could one then ascertain the morals of this world society 166
Morals, being based upon concepts of what is just, are at best
essentially pragmatic norms61 and at worst ephemeral will-o'-the-
wisp. It might be extremely difficult to define what is or is not
just. It seems improbable that any two men, however rational
they may be, would be likely to agree completely on what is or
is not just in any given factual situation. 6  This is true within
the local community of any nation whose individuals may be
drawn together by the "bonds of race, language, culture, common
historical experiences, common economic interests, or similar in-
stitutions."" It is not too difficult then to perceive the additional
difficulties one might find present in searching for a definition in
a world community composed of many cultures, races, historical
backgrounds, languages, and so forth.
Since many judges may not be philosophically inclined
7 0
we may be forced to concede that if the law of the place of mak-
ing and the like should declare, in unequivocable terms, that the
65 Discussing some distinctions between law and ethics, Sir Frederick Pollock
had this to say: "In assuming a scientific character, law becomes, and must needs
become, a distinct science. The division of science or philosophy which comes
nearest to it in respect to the subject-matter dealt with is Ethics. But, though
much ground is common to both, the subject-matter of Law and of Ethics is not
the same. The field of legal rules of conduct does not coincide with that of moral
rules, and is not included in it; and the purposes for which they exist are distinct.
Law does not aim at perfecting the individual character of men, but at regulating
the relations of citizens to the commonwealth and to one another. And, inasmuch
as human beings can communicate with one another only by words and acts, the
ofice of law does not extend to that which lies in the thought and conscience of
the individual." See Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (Macmillan & Com-
pany, London, 1896), p. 44. See also Macver, The Web of Government (The Mac-
millan Company, New York, 1947), pp. 3-38 and 193; Patterson, op. cit., pp. 30,
230-40, and 364.
66 Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law (The 'Macmillan Com-
pany, New York, 1924), pp. 3034.
67 Patterson, op. cit., pp. 473-500; Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 303-4.
68 Two or more people watching an accident involving the collision of two cars
will arrive at different conclusions of fact. Carry this concept further and watch
juries in action In any case at law and the truth of this statement is self-evident.
69 Willoughby, op. cit., p. 59.
70 Judges are often so pressed for time in making their decisions that possibly
philosophy is seldom used, at least not consciously.
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contract is illegal, the forum probably will consider it likewise
illegal.' We may also concede that the court of the forum nor-
mally, in such instances, considering itself to be the best judge
as to the legality or illegality of the contract, would be prone
to follow its own policy determinants." It would seem logical
to assume that unless the parties evade a dominant policy of a
place having the most vital or natural connection with an essen-
tial element of the transaction as viewed by the forum, or unless
some strong policy determinant of the forum interposes, there
may be no reason why the parties should not feel free to choose
a reasonable foreign law to govern their contract.73  In either
case, public policy is the basis of the exception to our contention.
3. Applying Public Policy
Before it would be possible to apply public policy to con-
tract situations, it would be necessary to know what is public
policy and what standards are to be used to ascertain what would
be a proper application of that public policy. Public policy, for
all practical purposes, is no more and no less than what the forum
considers is "justice." It is based upon the forum's concepts of
balance in social and economic bargaining, being circumscribed
by what the positive law of the state says is "just" or "legal."
71 This result may arise from several factors: (1) judges, similar to other men,
often tend to follow the line of least resistance; (2) persuasive authority from
foreign sources often influence the judge in his decision in a more positive manner
than one would ordinarily think of judicial use of persuasive authority; (3) judges
of the forum may often think that the place where the contract is made should
determine the choice of law for its governance because that place is (as they may
reason) its birthplace, or possibly the courts and legislatures of the place of
making knew some of the peculiar facts of the matter not presently known to the
court of the forum.
72 Cheatham and Reese, "Choice of the Applicable Law," 52 Col. L. Rev. 959
(1952) ; Harper, "Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading
Professor Lorenzen's Essays," 56 Yale L. J. 1155 (1947) ; Heilman, "Judicial
Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws," 43 Yale L. J. 1082 (1934);
Morse, "Characterization: Shadow or Substance?" 49 Col. L. Rev. 1027 (1949)
Neuner, "Policy Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. B. Rev. 479
(1942) ; Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173
(1933). See also Cook, op. cit., pp. 3-70; Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 474-84.
73 For a general discussion of this phase of the subject, see the illuminating
articles by Professor Cook entitled "The 'Validity' of 'Contracts'," 31 Ill. L. Rev.
143 (1936), and "The 'Validity' of 'Contracts': The 'Intention' of the Parties,"
32 Ill. L. Rev. 899 (1938), and 34 Ill. L. Rev. 423 (1939).
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However, whether a law governing a contract is "moral"
or "immoral," "legal" or "illegal," it must always "run the
gauntlet" of the public policy of the forum.74  There are writ-
ers who believe that it may also include the public policy of the
place of making, 75 or of other spatial contacts of the contract.
Here, we are concerned primarily with how far the public policy
of the forum may be permitted to affect the law of a conflict-of-
laws contract. To say the least, the scope of the forum's public
policy is contentious. And it may be assumed that even though
the forum may look to the public policy of the place of, wlit
it considers, the most vital or natural connection of an essential
element of the transaction to see if the law chosen by the par-
74 Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and The Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale
L. J. 736 (1924), discussing public policy, comments to the effect that: "The cor-
rect mode of approach to this subject would strip it of all fictions and deal with
all phenomena a posteriori. Thus viewed, we find that each sovereign state can
determine the rules of the Conflict of Laws in accordance with its own notions
of what is just and proper, and so far as the individual states of this country are
not bound by some constitutional provision, they have the same power . . . In
dealing with cases involving foreign elements the court will take into considera-
tion the needs of international trade and the requirements of an increasing inter-
course between states and nations. In certain cases, where the operative facts
connect the case with some foreign state or country, it will conclude that the
promotion of the above ends requires the application of 'foreign' law. In other
cases, in which the 'foreign' law is so far opposed to the local law as to shock the
conscience of the court, it will determine the case with reference to the local rule
. . . If the situation is one admitting of the application of 'foreign' law, the choice
of the rule to be applied will be determined again in many instances by general
social and economic considerations. For example, if the question relates to capac-
ity. a state may conclude that the principal interest involved is the protection of
its citizens or of persons domiciled within its territory, wherever they may be . . .
On the other hand, it may conclude that its principal interest in the matter is the
security of local transactions . . . Whatever the point or points of contact chosen
by the lex fori., special situations may require the application of the local rule . . .
Anglo-American courts, it is submitted, have developed the rules of the Conflict
of Laws in the main, though not always consciously, in the manner just outlined."
75 See Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 556-7, where the author, citing from Nussbaum,
"Rise and Decline of the Law of Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col.
L. Rev. 189 (1942), at p. 198, states: "Nussbaum encourages the courts to a more
uninhibited use of the public policy doctrine on the ground of local conceptions
of the conflict of laws. In his opinion, the tendencies against public policy were
caused by 'liberal' and international-minded illusions and still more by 'dogmatic'
preferences." Rabel himself, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 558-9, defines the problem of public
policy as follows: "The familiar formulas, declaring the priority of 'public policy
law of the state and morality' or reservations of 'imperative laws and good morals'
are too vague and comprehensive. Others, more modestly referring to public order
and good morals, are exploited far beyond their liberal meaning. If you establish
a conflicts rule on the premise that a certain situation of living should be gov-
erned by a certain foreign law and at the same time declare that this same situa-
tion under unspecified conditions may require resort to the law of the forum, you
have indeed deprived the conflicts rule of its legal character and reverted to the
fabulous 'cornftes gentium,' which negatived legal rules of international behavior
and left every decision to uncontrollable courtesy."
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ties is in conflict with it, yet, in so doing, the forum is not actually
applying a foreign public policy, but is applying that which it
has adopted from the foreign jurisdiction into its own norm.
Normally, the forum's public policy may be presumed to apply
only to domestic contracts unless it is clear and convincing that
the law of the forum has a broader scope. Since it is to be as-
sumed that societal interests in the world at large are to be
benefited, rather than retarded by upholding the validity of con-
tracts, the burden of proof should be upon those who allege that
the forum's law is broad enough in scope to impede conflict-of-
laws contracts. Philosophically, it seems a mystery why the laws
of one state, here the state of the forum, should be permitted
to govern the legal consequences flowing from a contract made
primarily for the benefit of the immediate parties unless those
parties have expressly stipulated for that law. It may be re-
peated that "just laws" do not repose in any one nation of the
world.
71
The laws of the forum, however, may refuse the enforce-
ment of contractual obligations when the obligations are obnox-
ious to the forum's sense of "fair play '1 7 or "morals. 7 8 Par-
ticularly is this the case when it is remembered that the court
of the forum, as is true in any state, must enforce the laws of
its own jurisdiction. But the question remains, how is the court
of the forum to determine the extent of the obnoxiousness in the
enforcement of its own public policy on conflict-of-laws con-
tracts? What norms or standards are to be used? Unless there
is some certainty in these norms, if they do exist, we are likely
to find one court in a state finding enforcement of a conflict-of-
laws contract impossible and another court within the same state
viewing it differently. In any event, the forum's policy deter-
minants should not be used as a screen for arbitrary judges.
Law must be as certain as it is humanly possible to make it
76 See ante, note 34.
77 See ante, note 74.
78 Ibid. Of course, as heretofore mentioned, the action of the forum is subject,
in the United States, to constitutional provisions of due process and full faith and
credit.
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certain in order that parties to conflict-of-laws contracts may
be able, with some degree of predictability, to know what the law
is before the court renders its decision.
4. The Problem Of Fraudulent Evasion
In any consideration of the central problem, one will come
in contact with several expressions used on occasion by courts
as well as by authors. Such expressions as "good faith," legal,"
"illegal," "moral," "immoral," "fraudulent evasion," "bona
fide," and "non-bona fide" have no intrinsic meaning of their
own. In order to have a meaning they must be qualified or de-
fined in their context so that one can ascertain in what sense
they are being used. To use them otherwise is to adopt weasel
words that have no meaning. And yet some of the courts and
writers use these terms without giving them a proper perspec-
tive. It would appear, therefore, that one must always ask the
question, is not the court, or the writer, using such terms as an
"escape clause" for what is actually meant? Is not the mean-
ing this: has the law chosen by the parties the most natural or
vital connection with some essential element of the transaction
as viewed by the forum? In asking this question the court, or
the writer, is looking for a policy determinant of the most vital
contact element to see if it is in conflict with the law as chosen
by the parties. For the forum, in the name of "justice" as it
sees the meaning of "justice" is more or less at liberty to find
this or that place the "most vital contact" of the contract so
as to fit its decision with what it deems "just."
So, if there is conflict between the law chosen by the par-
ties and what the forum views as the law of the most vital con-
tact of an essential contract element, then the forum may strike
down the agreement. Its reasons for so doing may be legion. It
may view the parties as economically upon an unequal plane so
that there is no freedom of contract in the first instance. It may
view the agreement as "immoral" and contrary to a strong policy
determinant of the forum or of the law of a place, as viewed by
the forum, having the most natural or vital connection with the
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agreement. Public policy concepts are so broad that they may be
made by the forum to cover a "multitude of sins" that "flesh
is heir to."
In any event, we may begin the discussion of fraudulent
evasion79 with the premise that "any law" of "any state" which
is compulsory on the parties must be obeyed by both the par-
ties and the courts of the state administering that law. The ques-
tion remains, what is, and when is there, fraudulent evasion of
the laws of the states by the parties? Another question of like
import is what laws are compulsory on the parties to conflict-
of-laws contracts? Certainly, not all of the laws of the parties'
states are compulsory in conflict-of-laws contracts. 0
What standards are to be used in determining this so-called
fraudulent evasion? Likewise, what standards are to be used
to determine that a state's laws are compulsory on the parties?
If the evasion is not against some policy determinant of the law
of a place having the most vital or natural connection with some
essential element of the transaction there can be little dispute
as to the answer to the first question."' Such evasions are not
deemed fraudulent unless there is also a strong public policy
of the forum violated by the chosen law. In such a case, the
forum may possibly find some pretext to void the agreement.
State laws, however, should not generally be invoked to impede
conflict-of-laws contracts. But by what means does the forum
79 At best, it would appear that the expression "fraudulent evasion" is but an
"escape clause" used by the forum to fit its decision to its definition of what is
"just." It may be assumed that when the parties choose the law of another state
to govern their contractual relations that they do so intentionally to evade laws
which they do not wish to govern their agreement. The question is not so much
whether they have intentionally evaded the laws of a state having the most vital
contacts with an essential element of the transaction, as the forum views it, but
whether it is improper for them to do it. If there is duress, coercion, fraud, mis-
take, unequal bargaining opportunity, economic oppression, or any number of other
reasons why the contract should not be upheld, what is to stop the forum from
using more direct corrective measures to see that there is actual freedom of con-
tract? If, on the other hand, there is freedom of contract, what is Improper in
the parties choosing the law they think more nearly meets their requirements in
the agreement?
SO See ante, at note 73.
s' Morris. Dicey's Conflict of Laws (6th Ed., 1949). p. 585, and Morris and
Cheshire. "The Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict of Laws," 56 L. Q. Rev.
3220 (1940).
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determine what is the most vital or natural connection of a con-
tract? Can all forums agree on what are the essential elements
of a contract? As to the second question, it would seem that in
regard to conflict-of-laws contracts, the proof should be clear
and convincing that the state's laws are compulsory, for again
state laws pertaining to local contracts generally should not
apply to conflict-of-laws transactions. 2
In any event, the burden of proof should remain upon those
who seek to impede conflict-of-laws contracts since those con-
tracts have more than local connections and serve more than
local interests. A balance must always be maintained among the
interests to be served by a conflict-of-laws contract.83 There are
the interests of the immediate parties which are of primary con-
cern to all. In addition, there are the interests of the state's own
community and that of the world community. All should be in-
terested in conflict-of-laws contract norms of certainty, predict-
ability, and uniformity. International transactions must not be
unduly impeded by local state laws out of proportion to the
interests involved.
Since the parties will normally obtain their actual reason-
able expectations by their own chosen law of referral and, fur-
ther, since it is to be presumed that reasonable men will not
select some foreign law of referral without a justifiable reason,
and in no case an unreasonable foreign law, it may be assumed
that the law expressly stipulated by the parties should be per-
mitted in the interest of all. 4
5. Unreasonableness of Burden on Forum
It has been said that the expressly stipulated law chosen
by the parties to govern their contracts may add an undue bur-
den on the forum to ascertain and apply the law of the parties"5
It would seem possible that if any of the other means used by
82 See ante, at note 73.
83 See ante, at notes 73-4.
84 Ibid.
85 Cook, op. cit., p. 412 et seq.
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the courts, such as the place of making, were rigidly applied,
it might be at least as likely, if not more so, that the law of the
place governing the contract might be that of Nepal or some
other inaccessible place as it would be if the parties were left
to choose their own law. Parties to contracts being reasonable
men, is it likely that they would seek out an unreasonable or an
inaccessible foreign law to govern their contract?
In addition, if the law chosen should superficially seem re-
mote, is it likely, in the mid-twentieth century, that the job of
ascertaining and applying the law of any reasonable reference
so chosen by the parties would entail undue strain on the court
of the forum? Adequate foreign-law reference libraries are now
to be found in many areas and, where these may be lacking, the
deficiency can be made up by resort to the library loan services
existing in many institutions of higher learning.
6. Use of an Expressly Stipulated Intent
Little space will be devoted here to a discussion of the prob-
lems, if any, to be generated under the autonomy theory, one that
allows parties to make use of an expressly stipulated intention
as to the law which they wish applied to their agreements, for
the point has been covered in detail in the other sections of this
paper. 6 It does seem essential, however, to summarize the ad-
vantages of the autonomy theory in order to give weight to what
follows,8 7 particularly so since the autonomy theory is conducive
to certain results.
86 As the other sections of this paper indicate the arguments for and against
the autonomy theory, all that is needed here is a summary thereof.
87 The late Professor Cook, in his article entitled "'Contracts' and the 'Conflict
of Laws': 'Intention' of Parties," 32 Ill. L. Rev. 899 (1938), at pp. 919-20, could
see no "theoretical or practical objections to giving effect to the 'intention' of the
parties when: (a) that 'intention' is expressed in words; (b) the choice of law
is limited to the 'law' (domestic rule) of some state with which the transaction
has a substantial connection; and (c) there is no reason of public policy which
indicates a contrary decision." I have shown why, in my opinion, the "most vital
and substantial contact" theory itself is rather mathematical in its rigidity. It
is also illogical in relation to its evaluative process of what is the most vital and
substantial contact. Reasonable men seldom see the same set of facts in an
identical manner.
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First, the theory provides, in general, for the fulfilment of
the "actual" 8 reasonable expectations of the parties to the con-
tract. Second, the courts of the forum are likely to be less
burdened in the ascertainment and application of the specific law
chosen by the parties than in the use of some more rigid mathe-
matical formula, such as, for instance, the place of making theory.
Third, it is unlikely that business men would often evade the
laws of their own states by the choice of a foreign reference law.
Fourth, any and all objections that may be weighed against the
autonomy theory must be weighed in the scales of social values.
These values relate to the immediate parties, the state or states
of the parties in the local state community, and the world societal
interests. Since upholding the validity of contracts seems to be
conducive to these three interests, it is felt that any state by
impeding conflict-of-laws norms of certainty, predictability, and
uniformity in interstate and international transactions should
pause to see if its own local interests outweigh the other values.
In addition to the foregoing, the autonomy theory would be
conducive to other results. Thus, fifth, policy determinants of the
88 Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective," 40 Yale L. J.
704 (1931), at pp. 709-10, says: "The other end of the development lies in a
credit economy in which bargains and promises are so much the normal course
of dealing that reliance on them is a matter of tacit presupposition; to which is
to be added: in a society in which intervention of legal officials when called upon
is rather expected than otherwise. The legal approach then is, fundamentally: a
bargain or promise is enforceable unless reason appears to the contrary." Austin,
Lectures on Jurisprudence (John Murray, London, 1873), 4th Ed., Vol. 2, p. 939,
declares: "A promise is binding because of or account of the expectations excited
in the promisee." Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1906), 10th Ed., p. 253, also concludes that, when the law enforces a con-
tract, it does so "to prevent disappointment of well-founded expectations." Notice,
however, that Holland does not here indicate the state whose law is so invoked in
the enforcement process.
89 Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1922), pp. 236-7, also provides much information on the reasons why, in
human society as a whole, and not as confined to any one state, promises should
be kept. He there states, in part: "Wealth, in a commercial age. is made up
largely of promises. An important part of everyone's substance consists of advan-
tages which others have promised to provide for or to render to him; of demands
to have the advantages promised which he may assert not against the world at
large but against particular individuals . . . If this is not secured, friction and
waste obviously result, and unless some countervailing interest must come into
account which would be sacrificed In the process, it would seem that the indi-
vidual interest in promised advantages should be secured to the full extent of
what has been assured to him . . .Hence, in a commercial and industrial society,
a claim or want or demand of society that promises be kept and that undertakings
be carried out In good faith, a social interest in stability of promises as a social
and economic institution, becomes of the first importance."
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forum should be strictly interpreted in the light of the advance-
ment of international contractual transactions through the vali-
dating of contracts. Sixth, the simplicity in the handling of
conflict-of-laws contracts by means of the autonomy theory, which
fixes some definite law or laws as the governing law of the con-
tract, is much to be desired over the inflexible and often highly
illogical and artificial means used at present by many courts.
Seventh, it is highly unlikely in the mid-twentieth century that
any one state is the sole depositary of just laws. When the argu-
ment is advanced that the law of the domicil or the laws of some
other state are more interested in seeing that justice is done
than the law of the place chosen by the parties, we may place the
burden of proof on those who so allege it. The law chosen by the
parties may on occasions be more sensitive to fair dealings and
moral concepts than even that of the domicil of the parties.
Eighth, the "newness" of legal theories and the failure to use
them because they are new, should not be permitted to retard the
advancement of any form of science or of life itself.
It may be doubted that a Beale would have made a "good"
Columbus in the matter of either discovering or using new
methods in this area of law. It is also true that the autonomy
theory still bears the mark of "newness" in the United States.
But that fact is no indication that the theory is not worthy of
at least a trial. Under it, the law chosen by the parties, not being
a law of chance dependent on either judicial decision or party
location at the time the contract is made,"° is both flexible and
ready to meet the changing needs of the social structure. On
90 A further answer to the "evasion" argument is provided by Professor Wolff
in his article entitled "Problems of Public and Private International Law," Grotius
Society Transactions for the Year 1949, Vol. 35, p. 143. He notes, at pp. 148-9, that
the connection "of a single contact with the chosen foreign legal system often
remains invisible if we look only to the single contact; but it becomes manifest if
we study the universal economic development of a country of which the single
contact forms only a tiny part." He also suggests that if the parties litigate in an
English court it is always possible for English law to be applied under the pro-
cedural rule which treats foreign law as a matter of fact open to stipulation as
any other fact. In a case where the foreign law is stipulated as being identical
with English law, the English judge is bound thereby. If such "innocent" sub-
terfuge may be used to permit autonomy, why is it improper when frank, honest
and direct means are used? Are we not. then. building mountains out of mole
hills by suggesting that an autonomous resort to the law of one state could ever
be a fraud upon the legal system of some other state?
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principle, then, but subject to reasonable impediments of the laws
of the states of the parties in interest and the policy determinants
of the law of the forum, there would seem to be no impelling
reason why contracting parties should not be permitted reason-
ably to choose the law they desire to govern their agreements,
provided they suitably express their stipulated intent.
(To be continued)
